98년 FBI의 보고서에 따르면 미기업기밀유출의 36%는 일본의 소행이라고 집계됨

(1위는 중국 41%, 2위는 일본 36%,3위는 프랑스, 한국은 6위)

일본은 모방 정도가 아니라 범죄수준의 기업기밀탈취가 이뤄지고 있다.

The report concluded that 80 percent of all Japanese-government intelligence assets were directed toward the
United States and Europe, concentrating on high technology developments. The CIA report also allegedly
explained the critical “intelligence gathering role” played by semi-official organizations, such as the Japanese
Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO), and
Japanese multinational corporations such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi.10 The CIA has assessed the quality of the
intelligence gathering operations of these companies to be every bit as sophisticated as the intelligence services of
smaller countries, including technical penetration and collection operations. In 1985, Professor Chalmers Johnson
of the University of California at San Diego estimated that JETRO operated seventy-five offices in fifty-nine
countries, with twenty-five of the offices located in “key foreign cities”. This amounted to a “worldwide intelligence
organization” with two hundred seventy agents overseas and twelve hundred analysts in Tokyo.11
The close working relationship between Japanese companies and the Japanese government is illustrated
in the famous IBM-Hitachi case, sometimes referred to as JAPSCAM. In 1981 Hitachi acquired a nearly-complete
set of the confidential and much coveted IBM Adirondack Workbooks from a former IBM employee. These were
state-of-the-art design workbooks containing technical secrets clearly marked FOR INTERNAL IBM USE ONLY.
Eventually, the combined efforts of IBM counterintelligence and FBI personnel led to the dramatic arrest of a
number of IBM officials and a reported, out of court settlement of US$300 million for IBM. What is most
interesting to note, is that Hitachi spymasters in Japan, who were supervising the espionage operations,
transmitted their instructions to Hitachi case officers in San Francisco through Japanese diplomatic
communications. The Japanese consulate had received telex instructions on how to proceed with the acquisition
program after meetings between Hitachi and the American agents had occurred in Tokyo. Once communication
was received in the consulate, the message was transmitted to the Hitachi man in Silicon Valley by the
commercial representative of the Japanese consulate.12
Similarly, in a remarkably candid interview appearing in Bungei Shunju, a Japanese monthly, in 1982,
chairman of Fujitsu Taiyu Kobayashi described, in calculating detail, how Fujitsu also acquired information on
IBM. While criticizing Hitachi for its blatant methods, he also explained how his firm avoided direct runs at IBM for
information in order to avoid detection and prosecution. The Washington Post reportedly had planned to reprint the
Kobayashi interview in its entirety in a January 1983 issue. However, after The Post obtained the rights to do so
from Bungei Shunju, Fujitsu became aware of it and pressured the monthly to cancel the agreement. The
Washington public relations firm of Ruder and Finn, which represents Fujitsu explained that, “Fujitsu suggested
that the complete version not be printed in the Post.”13 In another case it is believed that Fujitsu placed a
Japanese mole inside Fairchild Semiconductors between 1977 and 1986 which did substantial damage to the
company. This may be part of the reason why Fujitsu attempted to purchase Fairchild in 1986, while they were in
secret negotiations with Cray Research Corporation for closer collaborations. These few examples are merely the
tip of the iceberg when it comes to Japanese industrial espionage prowess. Unfortunately,
http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1996/papers/NISSC96/joyal/industry.pdf 
econd potentially serious economic espionage case came to light on May 9, 2001, when a federal grand jury indicted two Japanese scientists and charged them with numerous offenses, including stealing Alzheimer’s disease cells and genetic materials from the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Cleveland, Ohio, then hiding and passing them to a research institute in Japan.

The two men were identified as Takashi Okamoto and Hiroaki Serizawa. Serizawa, a Japanese citizen and permanent US resident, was arrested by the FBI on May 3 in Kansas City, Kansas. Okamoto, also a Japanese citizen and a former US resident, is in Japan, and the US Government is believed to be seeking his extradition. He headed the Lerner Research Institute, an Alzheimer’s laboratory at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation.

According to the indictment, Okamoto and Serizawa met and grew close in the mid-1990s while working in Boston. Okamoto left his post at Harvard to take his research program on Alzheimer"s disease to the Lerner Research Institute. Serizawa moved to an institution in Kansas City.

Okamoto then accepted a job offer in April 1999 to relocate his research program to the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in Saitama-Ken, Japan. Around midnight on July 8, Okamoto and a co-conspirator allegedly raided their own Cleveland Clinic laboratory, stole cells and other materials, destroyed much of what they did not take, then sought to cover up their actions.

Okamoto then shipped the biological materials to Serizawa in Kansas City for storage, then eventually transferred them to Japan. Okamoto resigned a few weeks later and started work in Japan in August.

Serizawa and Okamoto will be prosecuted under several laws, including the Economic Espionage Act, enacted by Congress in 1996 to stem the flow of secrets from US companies and laboratories to overseas competitors.

Serizawa pleaded not guilty on May 16 and the first hearing of his trial will be July 23. Okamoto has denied any wrongdoing.